A bs t r ac t
Background Fungal infections are rare complications of injections for treatment of chronic pain. In September 2012, we initiated an investigation into fungal infections associated with injections of preservative-free methylprednisolone acetate that was purchased from a single compounding pharmacy.
Methods
Three lots of methylprednisolone acetate were recalled by the pharmacy; examination of unopened vials later revealed fungus. Notification of all persons potentially exposed to implicated methylprednisolone acetate was conducted by federal, state, and local public health officials and by staff at clinical facilities that administered the drug. We collected clinical data on standardized case-report forms, and we tested for the presence of fungi in isolates and specimens by examining cultures and performing polymerase-chain-reaction assays and histopathological and immunohistochemical testing.
Results
By October 19, 2012, more than 99% of 13,534 potentially exposed persons had been contacted. As of July 1, 2013, there were 749 reported cases of infection in 20 states, with 61 deaths (8%). Laboratory evidence of Exserohilum rostratum was present in specimens from 153 case patients (20%). Additional data were available for 728 case patients (97%); 229 of these patients (31%) had meningitis with no other documented infection. Case patients had received a median of 1 injection (range, 1 to 6) of implicated methylprednisolone acetate. The median age of the patients was 64 years (range, 15 to 97), and the median incubation period (the number of days from the last injection to the date of the first diagnosis) was 47 days (range, 0 to 249); 40 patients (5%) had a stroke.
T here has been no systematic surveillance in the United States for adverse events that occur after glucocorticoid injections for the treatment of chronic musculoskeletal pain, but infection is a known, although probably rare, risk documented in the medical literature. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Infections that develop after a procedure are usually bacterial 2,7-10 ; fungal infections are extremely rare. [11] [12] [13] [14] We present data on a multistate outbreak of fungal meningitis and other infections associated with injections of preservative-free methylprednisolone acetate that was purchased from a single compounding pharmacy and describe the public health response to the outbreak.
Me thods

Index Patient and Early Epidemiologic Investigation
On September 18, 2012, the Tennessee Department of Health received a report of a 56-year-old patient with aspergillus meningitis. 15 The patient had no known risk factors for fungal meningitis but had received an epidural glucocorticoid injection for lower back pain at an ambulatory surgical center 46 days earlier. By September 25, the initial investigation, led by the Tennessee Department of Health in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), had identified seven additional patients with meningitis who had been treated at the same ambulatory surgical center. The cerebrospinal fluid cultures from the additional seven patients were initially negative. 16 However, the clinical presentation of these patients was similar to that of the index patient: all had a subacute onset of meningitis and marked cerebrospinal fluid pleocytosis; four had posterior circulation strokes.
All the patients, including the index patient, had received epidural glucocorticoid injections of 80 mg of methylprednisolone acetate per milliliter. All the vials of methylprednisolone acetate used for these injections had been purchased from a single compounding pharmacy, New England Compounding Center (NECC, Framingham, MA); all the injections involved methylprednisolone acetate from lot 05212012@68, 06292012@26, or 08102012@51. Other exposures common to these initial patients included contrast material, povidone-iodine, lidocaine, spinal needles, and epidural tray kits.
On September 25, 2012, NECC was informed of the investigation and the exposure of all eight patients in Tennessee to methylprednisolone acetate from three lots that had been shipped from NECC; the company reported orally that it had not previously received any reports of adverse events associated with these lots of methylprednisolone acetate. On September 26, NECC voluntarily recalled these three lots and provided the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the CDC with an invoice list for the 76 clinical facilities that had received these lots, dating back to May 21, 2012 , the date the first lot was produced. This list was used to initiate case finding in other states. On September 27, 2012, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services informed the CDC of a single patient in North Carolina who had a negative cerebrospinal fluid culture and a clinical syndrome similar to that of the patients in Tennessee, including subacute meningitis; the patient had a posterior circulation stroke on September 28. This patient had also received an epidural glucocorticoid injection and had been exposed to methylprednisolone acetate from one of the three lots, as well as to the same brands of lidocaine and povidone-iodine as those used for the patients in Tennessee. The report of this additional case suggested the possibility of an exposure that was not limited to the single ambulatory surgical center in Tennessee. Because compounded medications had been the cause of several prior outbreaks, 14,17,18 methylprednisolone acetate from NECC was considered to be a likely source.
On September 28, 2012, state and local health departments, in collaboration with the clinical facilities that had received and administered methylprednisolone acetate from the three lots, initiated the process of identification and notification of exposed patients. Clinical facilities reviewed medical records to compile lists of patients who had received injections from one or more of the three lots of methylprednisolone acetate. The lot number was frequently not recorded in medical records; in those instances, facilities determined the period during which vials from the three lots of methylprednisolone acetate were likely to have been used and included all patients who had received injections of methylprednisolone acetate during that period. Clinical facilities, with help from state and local health departments and the CDC, notified pa-tients by means of telephone calls, home visits, or letters. The objectives of the notification were to refer exposed persons who were symptomatic for immediate medical evaluation and to advise exposed persons who were asymptomatic to seek clinical follow-up in the event of future symptoms. Additional 21 Other fungi were also subsequently identified from vials of methylprednisolone acetate during the course of the outbreak, including Cladosporium cladosporioides from lot 08102012@51, R. laryngis from lot 06292012@26, and Paecilomyces formosus from lot 05212012@68. 21 Several bacillus species of bacteria were also identified from lot 08102012@51. 21 For the purposes of this analysis, a case was defined according to the presence of any of the following conditions at the time of clinical presentation in a person who had been exposed to one of the three lots of methylprednisolone acetate (05212012@68, 06292012@26, or 08102012@51) produced by NECC after May 21, 2012: meningitis of unknown cause that developed after an epidural or paraspinal injection; posterior circulation stroke due to presumed meningitis (without a cardioembolic source and without documentation of a normal cerebrospinal fluid profile) after an epidural or paraspinal injection; clinician-diagnosed osteomyelitis, abscess, or other infection of unknown cause in the spinal or paraspinal structures at or near the site of injection after an epidural or paraspinal injection; or cliniciandiagnosed osteomyelitis or worsening inflammatory arthritis of a peripheral joint diagnosed after a peripheral-joint injection, without a known cause. Clinically diagnosed meningitis was defined as signs or symptoms of meningitis and a cerebrospinal fluid profile with pleocytosis (>5 white cells per cubic millimeter), accounting for the presence of red cells (i.e., subtracting 1 white cell for every 500 red cells present).
Microbiologic Investigation
Clinical specimens from case patients, primarily cerebrospinal fluid or joint fluid, were evaluated at the CDC by means of polymerase-chain-reaction (PCR) assays, with the use of broad-range, internal transcribed spacer (ITS) region fungal primers. [22] [23] [24] [25] (PCR for fungal detection is a research test. It has not been cleared or approved by the FDA, and the performance characteristics have not been established. The results of this test should not be used for diagnosis, treatment, or assessment in clinical practice.) Sequencing of amplified fungal DNA and DNA extracted from fungal isolates was performed for the identification of fungal species. 25 Histopathological and immunohistochemical testing of tissue from autopsy or biopsy specimens, as well as PCR testing and DNA sequencing, were also performed at the CDC. 26 In addition, microbiologic testing of specimens from case patients was performed at local, state, and reference laboratories.
Investigation Oversight and Data Collection
This investigation was part of an emergency public health response; as such, it was not considered to be research that required review by an institutional review board or informed consent from the patients. Clinical data were collected with the use of a standardized case-report form developed for the outbreak.
Statistical Analysis
All analyses were performed with the use of SAS software, version 9.3 (SAS Institute). The incubation period was calculated as the number of days from the last injection to the date of diagnosis. For case patients with multiple diagnoses, an incubation period was calculated for each diagnosed infection. The date of diagnosis was defined in the following way: for patients with meningitis as the date of the initial lumbar puncture yielding cerebrospinal fluid that met the case criteria, for patients with stroke as the date of the stroke, for patients with spinal or paraspinal infections as the date of imaging that revealed those infections, and for patients with peripheral-joint infections as the date of arthrocentesis. National and state-specific attack rates were calculated as the number of case patients divided by the total number of exposed persons. National attack rates were calculated with data from all cases; state-specific attack rates were calculated with data from cases involving injections in nonperipheral joints only. Persons exposed to both types of injections (peripheral-joint and nonperipheral-joint injections) were included in both denominator categories. Lot-specific attack rates were also calculated (for details see the Supplementary Appendix).
R e sult s
Epidemiologic Investigation
On the basis of records provided by NECC, we determined that the three lots of methylprednisolone acetate comprised 17,675 vials that had been distributed to 76 facilities in 23 states. An active review of records by clinical facilities and state and local health departments identified 13,534 persons who had potentially been exposed to medication from at least one of the three lots: 12,068 (89%) had been exposed through epidural, spinal, or paraspinal injections, and 1648 (12%) through peripheral-joint or other injections. By October 19, 2012, state health departments reported that approximately 99% of the persons potentially exposed to these lots of methylprednisolone acetate had been contacted at least once.
As of July 1, 2013, a total of 749 cases had been identified in 20 states, according to the interval case counts that the states send to the CDC; 61 case patients (8%) had died. Of the 749 patients with infections, 323 (43%) had spinal or paraspinal infections only, 233 (31%) had meningitis only, 151 (20%) had meningitis and concurrent spinal or paraspinal infections, 33 (4%) had peripheral-joint infections only, 7 (1%) had stroke due to presumed meningitis, and 2 (<1%) had spinal or paraspinal infections and concurrent peripheral-joint infections.
Data from case-report forms were available for 728 case patients (97%) as of July 1, 2013: a total of 310 of these patients (43%) had spinal or paraspinal infections only, 229 (31%) had meningitis only, 148 (20%) had meningitis and concurrent spinal or paraspinal infections, 32 (4%) had septic arthritis after a peripheral-joint injection (Table 1) , 7 (1%) met the case definition for stroke due to presumed meningitis, and 2 (<1%) had spinal or paraspinal infections and concurrent peripheral-joint infections. The median age of these patients was 64 years (range, 15 to 97), and 432 (59%) were women. A total of 60 patients (8%) had underlying immunosuppression (Table 1) . Data on symptoms were available for 701 case patients (96%). The most commonly reported symptoms among case patients with meningitis only were headache (in 88%) and neck stiffness (in 49%); the most commonly reported symptoms among case patients with spinal or paraspinal infections only were back pain (in 63%) and headache (in 36%). A total of 84% of the case patients with peripheral-joint infections only (i.e., with no other site of infection) reported joint pain ( Table 1) .
The CDC received reports of stroke in 40 case patients (5%). In 7 patients, the stroke was due to presumed meningitis (lumbar puncture was never performed). A total of 33 patients had a stroke in addition to documented meningitis; data on the timing of the stroke were available for 32 of these patients: 12 had a stroke before or at the same time as the diagnosis of meningitis, and 20 had a stroke after the diagnosis of meningitis. Data on the type of stroke were available for 34 case patients; 24 strokes were ischemic, 6 were hemorrhagic, and 4 were both. Among the 28 case patients for whom the location of the stroke was known, 27 (96%) had strokes that involved the posterior circulation.
Data on antifungal treatment were available for 476 of the 728 case patients (65%) for whom case-report forms were available: 301 (63%) received voriconazole alone, 173 (36%) received both voriconazole and amphotericin B, and 2 (<1%) received amphotericin B alone. The earliest date of the onset of symptoms was July 7, 2012, in a patient who had a spinal or paraspinal infection; the first case patient with documented meningitis had an onset of symptoms on July 16, 2012. At the outset of this outbreak, most case patients received a diagnosis of meningitis; however by mid-October, spinal or paraspinal infections became the predominant diagnosis in case pa-
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Copyright © 2013 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. tients (Fig. 1) . Among the 728 case patients with available data on the incubation period (the interval from the date of the last injection to the date of the initial diagnosis), the median incubation period was 47 days (range, 0 to 249). Incubation periods were calculated for each syndrome (Fig. 2) ; the incubation period was longest among patients with peripheral-joint infections (median, 65 days [range, 22 to 190]) and shortest among patients who had a stroke without documented meningitis (i.e., in whom a lumbar puncture was not performed) ( 536 of the 728 case patients (74%) for whom case-report forms were available (Table 1) . Using case counts from July 1, 2013, we calculated the overall attack rate (i.e., the rate for any fungal infection meeting the case definition) as 5.5 cases per 100 exposed persons ( Table 2 ). The overall attack rate for nonperipheral-joint infections (meningitis, stroke due to presumed meningitis, and spinal or paraspinal infections) was 5.9 cases per 100 exposed persons, but the rate varied widely by state, ranging from 0 to 18 cases per 100 exposed persons (Table 2) . NECC shipped a total of 11,622 ml of the 05212012@68 lot of methylprednisolone acetate, 10,774 ml of the 06292012@26 lot, and 7092 ml of the 08102012@51 lot. On the basis of data from case-report forms received as of July 1, 2013, the lot-specific attack rates were estimated to be 6 cases per 1000 ml of methylprednisolone acetate used from lot 05212012@68, 40 cases per 1000 ml from lot 06292012@26, and 22 cases per 1000 ml from lot 08102012@51 (Table 3) .
Microbiologic Investigation
As of July 1, 2013, the CDC had received specimens from 519 case patients; for 173 of the case patients from whom specimens were obtained (33%), there was laboratory evidence supportive of a fungal infection: direct detection of fungal DNA in 87 fluid or tissue specimens (50%), a fungal isolate with identification confirmed by DNA sequencing in 33 (19%) , and evidence from the use of multiple techniques in 53 (31%). A total of 153 case patients had evidence of E. rostratum, and 1 case patient had histopathological evidence of invasive disease due to Aspergillus fumigatus. Evidence of other fungi of unknown clinical significance was present in 22 case patients, 6 of whom (27%) also had evidence of E. rostratum (further details are available in the Supplementary Appendix). For 9 case patients, laboratory evidence of fungal infection was available only from testing at outside laboratories: nonspecific fungal growth was reported for 1 patient, histopathological evidence was reported for 6, and direct DNA detection of fungus in fluid or tissue specimens was reported for 2.
Discussion
We describe epidemiologic and laboratory data from a multistate outbreak of fungal infections associated with injection of contaminated methylprednisolone acetate from a single compounding pharmacy. These infections comprise the largest outbreak of health care-associated infections reported to date in the United States. This investigation was a collaboration among federal, state, and local public health officials, as well as staff at clinical facilities, all of whom worked rapidly to contact patients and to collect, aggregate, and disseminate clinical and laboratory data, which helped guide interim diagnostic and treatment decisions. At the outset of this investigation, when patients had been identified only at a single ambulatory surgical center in Tennessee, our hypotheses about the source of the outbreak included both the possibility of contamination at the center and the chance that this could be part of a broader event involving product contamination at the point of production. Facility-specific contamination had resulted in a previous outbreak of aspergillus meningitis in Sri Lanka, which was traced back to contaminated spinal needles stored in damp closets. 11 Although fungal meningitis is extremely rare in immunocompetent hosts, sporadic cases have been reported after epidural injection, probably owing to breaks in aseptic technique during the procedure. 12 The subsequent report of a case in North Carolina suggested that this was not a facility-specific problem and that widespread contamination might have occurred. The FDA announcement on October 4, 2012, of visible fungal contamination in unopened vials of methylprednisolone acetate compounded at NECC confirmed the leading hypothesis that contaminated methyl- prednisolone acetate from NECC was causing serious fungal illness in patients who had received an injection with this medication. One critical component of the public health response was the rapid, active outreach targeting both patients and clinicians. Anecdotal data collected during the first week of the outbreak indicated that many of the initial patients had mildto-moderate symptoms that ordinarily would not have prompted urgent medical evaluation. 16 There was added concern that many clinicians would be unable to make a diagnosis of meningitis caused by molds because of the low yield of traditional diagnostic methods, such as culturing. [27] [28] [29] Therefore, there was a considerable potential for missed diagnoses in exposed patients if direct intervention to alert patients and clinicians did not occur. In addition, given the fact that the initial nine patients had poor outcomes, including death and posterior circulation stroke, rapid * The attack rate is the number of cases per 100 persons potentially exposed. CI denotes confidence interval. † For the attack rate of all infections, this category includes all persons who received any type of glucocorticoid injection (peripheral-joint or nonperipheral-joint injection). For the attack rate of meningitis and spinal or paraspinal infections, this category includes persons who received an epidural or spinal or paraspinal injection. ‡ Included are persons who had meningitis, stroke due to presumed meningitis, and spinal or paraspinal infections. § Cases were attributed to the state in which the patient received the injection, not the state of residence. Persons potentially exposed to implicated methylprednisolone acetate were reported in California and Connecticut, but there were no cases in those states. Implicated methylprednisolone was shipped to Nevada, but no persons in that state were reported to have been exposed, and there were no cases.
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notification could allow for early diagnosis and treatment, which could reduce the risk of poor outcomes. The extent of the contamination of the three lots of methylprednisolone acetate is not known. We identified at least two organisms in patients, E. rostratum and A. fumigatus, that caused infection. Additional fungi, most of which are common environmental molds but rarely cause human disease, [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] were identified in specimens from case patients, as well as in the product, 21 but are of unclear clinical significance. Some of these organisms, when injected into a sterile site, might have contributed to the disease by causing inflammatory reactions without true infection.
Despite the magnitude of potential exposure to contaminated methylprednisolone acetatewith more than 13,000 persons exposed -disease has developed in a relatively small proportion of exposed persons, to date. In addition, state-specific attack rates have varied widely, from 0 to 18 cases per 100 exposed persons; lotspecific attack rates have also varied considerably. Because all states achieved near-complete notification of exposed persons, the wide range of attack rates observed is unlikely to be due to large differences in case-finding methods. Rather, differences in the degree of contamination, the receipt dates and storage times of the lots, and injection practices might have contributed to the varying attack rates observed in different facilities and states. The longest incubation period in a 2002 outbreak of fungal meningitis after injection of contaminated glucocorticoids was 116 days, 14 reflecting the subacute nature of some fungal infections of the central nervous system. In this outbreak, we also observed lengthy incubation periods; in some case patients, the diagnosis was made more than 8 months after their last injection. As of July 2013, a few additional cases (1 to 2 per month) continue to be reported in this outbreak; continued vigilance for disease among exposed patients is still warranted.
The clinical course for case patients remains uncertain. Although many case patients have completed antifungal therapy and their conditions are currently stable or improved, relapses of infection are possible. 37 Continued vigilance for recrudescence of infection among known case patients, even after the resolution of symptoms and normalization of cerebrospinal fluid variables, is warranted. Further study of the most effective antifungal therapy and duration of treatment, as well as long-term outcomes in case patients, will be helpful for informing clinical guidance.
There are several limitations of this investigation. First, we lacked lot-specific data on exposure for many patients, which prevented the exact calculation of lot-specific attack rates. This also made it impossible, in many facilities, to enumerate the exact number of patients exposed to the three lots of methylprednisolone acetate; the numbers presented here are estimates that took into account the time during which the implicated lots of methylprednisolone acetate were in use at clinics and the number of patients who underwent procedures during that time. Second, when estimating the rate of use, we assumed that the use of methylprednisolone acetate ceased within 4 days after the recall and that all methylprednisolone acetate used at each clinic came from NECC. These assumptions might not be true for each facility; some facilities might have stopped using methylprednisolone acetate earlier or later than 4 days after the recall or they might have used methylprednisolone acetate from other manufacturers at the same time that they were using methylprednisolone acetate from NECC. Third, some data, particularly data on symptom onset, are subject to recall bias. Finally, our investigation was also subject to the limitations of existing diagnostic assays to detect fungal infections.
Our findings have two important implica- * The attack rate is the number of cases per 1000 ml of methylprednisolone acetate. † Included are cases in persons exposed to the indicated lot; some persons had exposure to more than one lot. ‡ In the sensitivity analysis, all cases for which the lot exposure could not be determined were assigned to each lot, in order to assess the maximum possible attack rate for each lot.
tions. First, it is imperative that steps are taken to ensure that compounded medications that are labeled as sterile are safe and uncontaminated. The consequences of contamination of a widely distributed, compounded medication used for injection can be devastating, as was shown in the current outbreak. Compounded medications were the source of several outbreaks before the outbreak described here, 14, 17, 18 and other contamination issues with compounding pharmacies have occurred since this outbreak. 38, 39 Understanding how to prevent contamination of products is essential for public health and the public confidence in the health care delivery system. Second, the large-scale public health efforts undertaken in this investigation required a strong public health infrastructure and collaboration among clinicians and public health officials at the state, local, and federal levels. These efforts played a critical role not only in alerting the public to an evolving health threat, but also in collecting, aggregating, and disseminating information in real time, with the information used both to understand the scope and source of the outbreak and to drive efforts to reduce further morbidity and mortality.
